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Introduction
In 1942, R. Buckminster Fuller, an American philosopher, engineer and visionary set out to discover whether scientific achievements
occurred in any regular or predictable pattern.1 He studied the speed
of travel, the discovery of the elements and the speed at which inventions were adopted for common use. It took 150 years for the steam
engine, 50 years for the automobile, 25 years for the radio, 15 years
for the transistor and 5 years for the microchip to become commonplace. 2 The technological trend remains unmistakable: Advanced societies are continuing to embrace new technologies for everyday use
at a pace that increases exponentially.
Such a rapid adoption of new technologies is taking place in the
area of information technology, from the speed and volume of transmission to storage capacity. As Alvin Toffler, a noted commentator,
acknowledged: "More diversity and change equals more information,
equals more technology to handle the information, leading to still
more diversity and change." 3
The possibilities are exciting, especially for those involved in areas of high technology development and manufacturing. Emerging
technologies, however, present threats to the livelihood of creative individuals and current or future copyright owners. Nevertheless, those
individuals are still eager to participate in the ongoing information
revolution. If history is an accurate indicator, however, they have a
valid reason to fear that Congress will supply inadequate legal protections for their creative works. This prediction is especially true for
musical artists and producers4 of sound recordings.
This Article focuses on the inadequate protection of sound recordings from unauthorized noncommercial home taping. For years,
producers of recordings have watched as millions of people annually
have made over one billion cassette recordings of copyrighted sound
recordings.6 This widespread practice of unauthorized home taping
1. JOHN CHESTERMAN, THE ELECTRONIC PIRATES 194 (1987).
2. Id. at 195.
3. ALVIN TOFFLER, PREVIEWS AND PREMISES (1984); see also CHESTERMAN, supra
note 1, at 195.
4. In this Article, the term "producers" refers to both the record companies and the
performers of sound recordings.
5. Sound recordings enjoyed no federal copyright protection until February 15, 1972,
the effective date of the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971. Only recordings fixed and
published after that date received the amendment's protection.
6. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (OTA), COPYRIGHT & HOME COPYING:
TECHNOLOGY AND CHALLENGING THE LAW, OTA-CIT-422, at 153-54 (1989) [hereinafter
1989 OTA REPORT].
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not only intuitively seems unfair, but also has harmed the recording
industry and society as a whole. First, home taping has displaced
some of the demand for prerecorded material.7 People who make
their own tapes from broadcasts or phonorecords8 belonging to
friends, family members or libraries are less likely to purchase original
recordings. This usurpation of demand for records has harmed the
recording industry economically: performers, vocalists, composers
and record companies are all affected.' Second, allowing people,
some of whom have not even purchased an original record, to make

unauthorized copies of copyrighted musical recordings is intuitively
wrong and unfair. Creative producers do not labor to have their
works purloined by home tapers. Third, and perhaps most important,
home taping of copyrighted works has harmed society. Home taping
decreases the funds available to the recording industry for the development of new musical acts, thereby decreasing the amount of records
made overall.
Despite these important reasons for compensating the recording

industry for home taping, until recently Congress did nothing to address the problem. On October 28, 1992, President Bush signed the

Audio Home Recording Act of 19921" (hereinafter AHRA or the
Act) into law.11 AHRA places a small royalty on digital sound recording media and equipment. The Act also requires manufacturers

of digital recorders to incorporate circuitry that prevents serial copying. Finally, the Act bars infringement suits based on private copying
performed in accordance with the Act.
Although the Act is a step in the right direction, it inadequately
protects musical performers and copyright holders. For example, the
7. Id.
8. A "phonorecord" is described by the Copyright Act as the material object in which
sounds are fixed. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). In this Article, the term "record" is used to
denote a "phonorecord."
9. There has been disagreement over the aggregate economic effects of home taping.
The findings of the latest study, the 1989 OTA REPORT, are ambiguous. See supra note 6.
For example, one of the contracted reports concluded that the presence of home copying
does cut into demand for recorded material, but that it stimulates prices charged for prerecorded formats because the originals are worth more since they can be used to generate
copies. Id. at 183. The 1989 OTA REPORT is not particularly useful because it compares
societal welfare assuming unmitigated home taping with societal welfare assuming an absolute ban on home taping. The Report's conclusions inadequately consider the economic
effects of a less draconian measure, royalty on tapes and recording equipment. Appropriately, the final words of the 1989 OTA REPORT, which appear in boldface, are: "It is
potentially misleading to base policy on an estimate of one of several harms or benefits."
Id. at 207.
10. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4242 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1992)).
11. See Dennis Wharton, Bush Signs DAT Measure into Law, DAILY VARIETY, Oct.
30, 1992.
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Act only applies to digital media and equipment-it imposes no royalties on analog recording tape and equipment. Yet the inequities and
economic loss presented by home taping will continue to emanate
from analog home taping for the foreseeable future. In addition, the
Act does not create a performance right in sound recordings, even
though this has been recommended by the Copyright Office and
scholarly commentators for almost two decades.' 2 The adverse effects
to the recording industry resulting from the Act's deficiencies will increase over the next few years as new technologies in digital audio
transmission and recording are introduced and become popular.
This Article argues that producers of American recorded music
are inadequately protected from home taping under American copyright law. Specifically, the shortcomings of AHRA, the latest attempt
at breathing equity into the Copyright Act, will be explored. Additionally, the Article suggests that certain emerging technologies make
the need more acute for both protections from analog home taping
and a performance right in sound recordings. This Article makes proposals for legal reform to remedy these shortcomings. The preAHRA legal status of home taping will be investigated, and recent
developments in digital recording and transmission technologies will
be reviewed. The analysis demonstrates that in 1992, Congress had
both an opportunity and a duty to supply the creators of American
recorded music with a better system of protection from home taping
than is provided under AHRA.
I
Home Taping: The Problem and its Legal Status
A.

Constitutional and Statutory Background

Copyright law is essentially a system of property. 13 As with real
property, proprietors of copyrights are granted certain rights of dominion over their "property." Whereas a landholder's primary concern is trespass, a copyright holder's primary concern is unauthorized
copying of his or her work.
12. See, e.g., Addendum to the Report of the Register of Copyrights on Performance
Rights in Sound Recordings, reprinted in Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 114-25 (1978) [hereinafter Register of
Copyrights on Performance Rights in Sound Recordings]; Steven J. D'Onofrio, In Support
of Performance Rights in Sound Recordings, 29 UCLA L. REV. 168 (1981); H. Craig Hayes,
Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: How Far to the Horizon, 9 PERF. ARTS REV. 121
(1979), reprinted in 27 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 113 (1982).
13. WILLIAM S. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (1990).
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In order to encourage authors to create new works, article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution authorizes Congress to grant
exclusive rights to holders of copyrights.1 4 Article I provides: "The
Congress shall have power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."15 In the seminal case of Mazer v. Stein,'6 the Supreme Court
acknowledged:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered. 7
Thus, it is believed that the benefits society derives by protecting
copyright holders' works justify the limited monopoly granted under
8
federal copyright law.1
Pursuant to this economic incentive philosophy, Congress, under
the Copyright Act, established the rights that prevent others from depriving authors and publishers of the fruits of their labors. 9 The latest federal copyright regime, the Copyright Act of 1976,20
implemented constitutionally sanctioned protections for authors
against unauthorized copying of "original works of authorship."'"
Five distinguishable exclusive rights are reserved for the copyright holder in § 106 of the 1976 Act.22 The two statutory rights relevant to this Article are the right to copy a work (§ 106(1))23 and the
right to publicly perform it (§ 106(4)). 2 4 The exclusive rights created
in § 106 are subject to important limitations found in §§ 107 through
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. Id.
16. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
17. Id. at 218. See also Copyright Law Revision: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. Serial 36, Part 1 (1975) (testimony of Irwin Karp) (describing the copyright
clause as an "independent, entrepreneurial property-rights system of writing and
publishing").
18. It should be noted that not all commentators share this view. See, e.g., Stephen
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (arguing that the
limited monopoly created for copyright law is unjustified).
19. Id.
20. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1977)).
21. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-810 (1982).
22. Id. § 106.
23. Id. § 106(1).
24. Id. § 106(4).
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120 of the Act.2 5 Two of these exceptions are central to this Article:
the "fair use" exception, and the express denial of a performance right
in sound recordings.
The fair use exception, contained in § 107 of the Act,26 essentially
is an affirmative defense to an infringement claim. It is applicable
primarily in areas of nonprofit education, research and scholarship,
of information will be
where public policy favoring the dissemination
27
furthered by the infringing activity.
Section 107 identifies four factors to be considered in "determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use." 28 These factors are: (1) the commercial or noncommercial nature of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount
of the work used and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work. 29 Courts have identified the fourth statutory factor, that is, the economic effect of the allegedly infringing
activity on the potential market for the protected work, as "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use."3 The question of
the economic effect of home copying on the recording industry has
dominated the debate over home taping in both the scholarly journals
and Congress.31
The arguments for and against finding home taping a fair use will
not be repeated at length since not only have such arguments been
presented many times before, 32 but also AHRA makes the debate ir33
relevant by deeming noncommercial taping a noninfringing activity.
However, it should be noted that the second, third and fourth statutory factors strongly favor the recording industry's position that home
25. Id. §§ 107-120.
26. Id. § 107.
27. JOHN SHELTON LAWRENCE AND BERNARD TiMBERG, FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY 297-98 (1989). But see, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984) (finding home videotaping of entertainment programs to be fair use).

28. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (citing 3 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 13.05[A] (1991)).
31. See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan, An Economic Look at Taxing Home Audio Taping,
32 J. BROADCASTING. & ELEC. MEDIA 89 (1988); Jonathan Fein, Home Taping of Sound

Recordings: Infringement or Fair Use?, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 647 (1983); M. Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV.

1505 (1982) [hereinafter Nimmer, Dispelling the Betamax Myth].
32. See, e.g., Ozer M. N. Teitelbaum, The Wrath of Cahn: Is All Fair in DAT and
Copyrights?, ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 19, 31 (1992-93)
(supports finding a fair use). But see Todd Page, DigitalAudio Tape Machines: New Technology or Further Erosion of Copyright Protection?,77 KY. L.J. 441, 459 (1988-89); Nimmer, Dispelling the Betamax Myth, supra note 31.
33. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4242 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1992)).
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audio taping is not a fair use. First, musical recordings consist of precisely the creative "nature" that the Copyright Act is intended to protect and encourage. Second, home tapers copy individual songs in
their entirety and often copy entire albums.34 Finally, studies support
the assertion that home taping causes economic harm to copyright
holders.3"

The other exception relevant to the home taping issue is the express statutory denial of the § 106(4) performance right in the case of
sound recordings.3 6 Under this exception, found in § 114 of the 1976
Act, once a sound recording is produced, purchasers are free to perform the recording anywhere without paying either the sound recording copyright owner, or the performers, a fee. 37 This is contrary to the
treatment of composers of the underlying works who enjoy the protection of the performance right through a compulsory licensing
scheme. As will be explored below, the exception to the performance
right created by § 114 is relevant to the home taping debate because
the exception, combined with the prevalence of uncompensated analog home taping, denies record producers and performers adequate
compensation for their contributions. This phenomenon will likely be
exacerbated as new digital delivery technologies are introduced.38
Under-compensation for high quality home taping and the omission of
performance rights in sound recordings will represent a double economic blow to the creators of American music.
B. Home Taping or Home "Taking"?: The History of Home Taping's
Legal Status

Before the Philips Company introduced the audio cassette format
in 1963, home copying of sound recordings was not a common occurrence. Indeed, because sound recordings did not enjoy federal copyright protection until 1972, to the extent that home copying occurred,
it was a noninfringing activity. 39 During that period, record piracy
34. The 1989 OTA REPORT found that 48% of home tapers taped albums in their
entirety. See 1989 OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 155.
35. The 1989 OTA REPORT found that 38% of taped albums represented would-be
purchases. 1989 OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 206 n.117. Respondents in the OTA survey
reported that nearly five out of every ten taped albums are would-be purchases, but that
one of these five would displace another purchase, leaving the net effect at approximately
four out of every ten. Id. This is roughly the same figure reported in a 1982 study sponsored by Warner Communications, Inc. Id.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 114.
37. See id.
38. See infra Part I.C.2.
39. This is true even though home copying arguably infringed the copyrights in the
underlying musical compositions.
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(i.e., making unauthorized recordings for commercial use) and not
home copying, posed the greatest threat to the recording industry. By
the early 1970s, it was calculated that 60% of the records and tapes in
New York were illegally pirated copies.4 ° Indeed, in 1971, a bootleg
recording of Jimi Hendrix made it to the top half of the LP charts.4 1
In 1971, Congress enacted the Sound Recording Amendment, extending copyright protection to sound recordings for the first time.4 2
By adopting the Amendment, Congress finally recognized that "sound
recordings are clearly within the scope of the 'writings of an author'
capable of protection under the Constitution, and that the extension
of limited statutory protection to them is overdue. '43 However, the
Amendment was aimed at record pirates, not home tapers. Congress
made it clear in the Amendment's legislative history that home taping
for private use was not considered infringing activity."
This development obviously took the wind out of the sails of
those who argued that home taping constituted infringement. This argument, however, was revived after Congress enacted the Copyright
Act of 1976, which superseded the 1971 Amendment. Beyond the
1976 Act's general fair use provision, nothing in its text or legislative
history suggested that home taping was considered a noninfringing activity.45 In fact, the legislative history of the Act did not even refer to
the House Report of the 1971 Amendment.4 6 Professor Nimmer
found this omission, as well as the House Report of the 1976 Act
which stated that the Act "is not intended to give [taping] any special
status under the fair use provision or to sanction any reproduction
40. CHESTERMAN, supra note 1, at 37.
41. See id.
42. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No.92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102(a)(7), 106(1), 106(3)-(4), 116, 401-02, 412, 501-04
(Supp. IV 1980)).
43. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
44. Although the text of the Sound Recording Amendment contained no reference to
home taping, the House Report states: "Specifically, it is not the intention of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from broadcast or from tapes or records, of recorded
performances, where home recording is for the private use and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially on it." H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 7, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1572.
45. Nimmer, Dispelling the Betamax Myth, supra note 31, at 1509-10. Professor Nimmer also points out that the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 applied only to sound
recordings and did not affect the existing copyright in the underlying musical work. Id.
Thus, home tapers still would infringe the copyright in the musical composition even after
the 1971 Amendment. Id. at 1509. See also Michael Plumleigh, Comment, Digital Audio
Tape: New Fuel Stokes the Smoldering Home Taping Fire, 37 UCLA L. REv. 733, 737, n.16
(1990).
46. Id.
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beyond the normal and reasonable limits of fair use,"4 7 to be
significant.
The 1976 Act's bare treatment of the home taping issue as well as
its codification of the fair use doctrine shaped the debate over home
taping for two decades. While scholars, the recording industry and
electronics manufacturers bickered over whether home copying was
fair use, repeated bills were introduced in Congress to institute royalties on blank tapes and/or to require equipment manufacturers to
adopt electronic copy management systems. 8 Despite intense lobbying efforts by groups like the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA), none of these legislative efforts advanced beyond
the committee stage.
Amidst this atmosphere of intense lobbying, the recording industry and performing artists aligned and argued that home taping of
records was infringement, plain and simple. 9 They argued that § 106
of the Copyright Act reserves the exclusive right of copyright owners
to copy a protected work, and home taping clearly infringes that exclusive right.5 0 A large amount of home taping represents a lost sale
of the original product. The recording industry and performing artists
argued that private home taping costs the industry over a billion and a
half dollars in annual record sales.5 ' The economic harm argument
bolstered the recording industry's claim that private taping was an infringement, and not fair use.5 2
The home electronics and blank cassette tape manufacturers
claimed that not only was home taping of copyrighted materials not a
serious problem for the recording industry, but also that home taping
actually helped to stimulate record sales. 3 They insisted that people
would share music with their friends, who would then purchase an
original recording for themselves. Regardless of whether home taping
harmed the recording industry, they argued home taping was a fair
47. Nimmer, Dispelling the Betamax Myth, supra note 31, at 1514-17 (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5669, 5679).
48. See, e.g., Home Audio Recording Act: Hearings on S. 1739 Before the Comm. on
the Judiciary and its Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, 99th Cong., 1st and
2d Sess. (1985-86).
49. See, e.g., Issues Presented by Digital Audio Tape: Joint Hearings on S. 506 and H.R.
1384 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-33 (1987) [hereinafter Issues
Presented by Digital Audio Tape: Joint Hearings] (statement of Jason S. Berman, Presi-

dent, Recording Industry Association of America).
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
51. See Brennan, supra note 31, at 100.

52. See supra note 28-35 and accompanying text.
53. Id.
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use, since it was noncommercial by nature and did not cause economic
harm to copyright holders. 54 Their claim was strengthened by the
1984 Supreme Court decision in the Sony Betamax case. 5 In that
case, the Court held that home recording. of television broadcasts for
the purpose of "time-shifting" (i.e., watching a program at a later
time) was a fair use.
The hotly-disputed issue of whether home taping is fair use was
never litigated, since both sides opted to lobby Congress for statutory
protection rather than risk an adverse judicial decision. Despite the
possible negative implications of the Sony Betamax case on the record
industry's position, the recording industry occupied the higher legal,
and certainly moral, ground. 56 As the 1980s came to a close, the record producers had the benefit of a bargaining chip that they had previously lacked in their fight with the electronics industry.
C. New Technologies Sharpen the Home Taping Problem
1. The DAT Debacle

By the late 1980s, the electronics manufacturers were eager to
introduce new home digital audio recording products to the United
States. In 1987, the hardware for the first digital home recording format, DAT, was available in Japan and Europe. By late 1992, two new
formats, Philips's Digital Compact Cassette (DCC) and Sony's
MiniDisc were ready for shipment. However, it would not be feasible
(nor legally advisable) for manufacturers to market these digital recorders in America unless two barriers were removed. First, the record industry had to market prerecorded products in new formats that
were compatible with the new machines. Such prerecorded material
in new formats was thought to be necessary to make the new DCC
and MiniDisc machines a more desirable investment for wary consumers, who only had recently been told that the compact disc (CD)
would be state of the art well into the future. Second, the threat of
vicarious copyright infringement suits by record producers and composers had to be removed. This unusual set of circumstances provided
the recording industry with the leverage vis-+'a-vis the electronics
manufacturers that it had always lacked. By taking advantage of this
leverage, the recording industry could extract concessions concerning
serial copy protection and home copying royalties from the electronics
manufacturers in return for removing the two barriers to the successful marketing of digital recorders.
54. Id.
55. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
56. See supra Introduction.
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In 1989, the International Recording Industry and the Consumer
Electronics Industry reached a compromise during their meeting in
Athens, Greece. As a result of the compromise, manufacturers of
DAT machines were to insert Serial Copy Management Systems
(SCMS) into all consumer DAT recorders." As explained in Part
III.A of this Article, SCMS prevents users of equipped machines from
making digital recordings of first generation copies of musical recordings, but allows an unlimited number of copies to be made from the
original source. Additionally, the so-called Athens compromise stipulated that the recording industry could continue to seek a royalty solu58
tion for home taping.
In 1990, Samuel Cahn and four music publishing companies that
were dissatisfied with the Athens compromise filed a class action infringement suit against Sony Corporation of America in an attempt to
bar DAT technology from the United States. 59 This case would have
determined the legal status of home audio taping had the parties not
settled out of court in July 1991. 0 Sony, as well as other electronics
manufacturers, agreed to support a royalty scheme for digital recording media and equipment in exchange for the class dropping its suit.6 '
The settlement provided that Sony would support legislation on the
issue, thus breaking the lengthy lobbying struggle between the recording industry and the electronics manufacturers.62 The terms embodied
in the Athens compromise and the Sony-Cahn settlement ultimately
became the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992.63
2. Other New Technologies

AHRA was enacted just before two important new digital recording formats, Philips's DCC and Sony's MiniDisc, were introduced.
While it is widely believed that the market can ultimately support only
one of these formats, the format that succeeds in commanding market
attention is likely to be the home taping format of choice well into the
57. Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman's Remarks to the ABA Conference, 38 PAT.
(BNA) 468 (Aug. 31, 1989) [hereinafter Oman's Remarks];
New Bill Would Require DAT Recorders to Inhibit Second-Generation Copying, 39 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 345 (March 1, 1990).
58. Teitelbaum, supra note 32, at 19, 23; Oman's Remarks, supra note 57, at 468.
59. Teitelbaum, supra note 32, at 19.
60. Id. at 30.
61. Id. at 30-31.
62. Id. at 31.
63. Home Audio Recording Bill Gets Warm Reception At House Panel Hearing,WASHINGTON INSIDER, Apr. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAWI File.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
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future. 64 The older, original DAT format, which suffered from an expensive design based upon videotape machines, will probably not be
marketed as a consumer item. All of these machines are capable of
making near-perfect recordings. When interfaced with a pure digital
source (e.g., a CD player with a digital as opposed to an analog output) the copies are identical.
In addition to coinciding with the launch of DCC and MiniDisc,
the AHRA was introduced at a time when important advances in
broadcasting, satellite and cable technologies were waiting in the
wings. First, some cable operators already offer music channels to
subscribers. One company in Los Angeles, Digital Musical Express
(DMX) transmits thirty channels of CD-quality digital music to subscribers of forty cable-television systems throughout America.65 Like
radio stations, the thirty DMX channels are devoted to relatively narrow sub-genres of music, thus conforming closely with listeners' tastes.
The next infrastructure to facilitate delivery of CD-quality sound
to the home will probably involve fiber optic networks. These networks could offer enormous capacity compared with conventional
copper wire telephone lines and coaxial cabling used in today's cable
systems.66 Fiber optic networks could, for example, simultaneously
carry voice telephone communications, high speed data services, CD67
quality audio and high definition television into private homes.
Thus, it can be expected that telecommunications companies will engage in the business of delivering music to their subscribers.
Either delivery system may be used to provide listeners with uninterrupted music, since subscription fees obviate the need for advertising and automation obviates the need for announcers. For example,
68
the DMX service currently in operation carries uninterrupted music,
while a display on the remote control shows what is being played.69
In addition, either system may provide "pay-per-play" services.
One Florida cable operator already provides a pay-per-play service
64. Although it is too early to make accurate predictions, by 1995, Philips's DCC format is expected to outsell Sony's MiniDisc by almost two to one. Philips DCC Portable
Player Sales Reportedly to Outpace Sony MiniDisc, AFX NEws, April 21, 1993. Could it be
that Sony, as it did with its failed Betamax format, again has put its money on the wrong
format?
65. No Money Down; The Digital Transmission of Music is a Passport to Something.
The Question is What, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 1992, at 13 [hereinafter No Money Down].
The service costs $10 a month, and was expected to be introduced in Europe by mid-1992
via satellite.
66. 1989 OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 53.
67. Id.
68. No Money Down, supra note 65.
69. Id.
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that allows subscribers to view music videos on demand.70 This service provides a selection of up to 1000 music video titles, which scroll
across the bottom of the television screen. The viewer can order a
particular music video by dialing a local 976-number and entering the
code for the desired song.7 As of 1989, a New York-based firm
planned to introduce a cable radio service 72 whereby an optional
channel would allow pay-per-play reception of either new album releases or special concerts.73
Finally, once the radio broadcasting industry reaches an agreement regarding technical standards, digital audio broadcasting (DAB)
will replace analog broadcasting as the dominant mode of transmitting
music to listeners over the airwaves.74 In addition to offering significant advantages to radio reception in automobiles, a quality DAB signal will sound the same as a CD. 75 This is in stark contrast to current
AM and FM signals, which suffer from low dynamic capabilities,
"fizz," multipath and fading problems, as well as incomplete coverage
of the spectrum of frequencies detectable by the human ear.76
Some of these advances may pose new threats to record producers. There are two types of potential threats which may be presented
as a result of two different characteristics. First, the high quality of
these new dissemination systems, some of which will transmit pure
digital signals, will facilitate equally high quality, possibly perfect,
home taping. Second, some of these systems will offer features, such
as uninterrupted music, pay-per-listen and music formats which are
closely tailored to the listeners' particular tastes. These features, in
addition to facilitating home taping of sound recordings, may make
some of these dissemination systems attractive substitutes for prerecorded music in any format. Record producers have reason to fear
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 1989 OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 53.
73. Id. In 1989, the company reportedly was negotiating blanket licenses with BMI
and ASCAP and having discussions with record company executives, who traditionally
have been unreceptive to pay-per-play home delivery systems.
74. Germany will probably be the first country to begin the switch-over to DAB, and
by 1995, digital stations should be available in the United States. Some developing and
formerly communist countries may adopt commercial digital networks without first having
developed analog ones. No Money Down, supra note 65, at 13.
75. Id.; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE STUDY ON DIGITAL
AUDIO BROADCASTING AND CABLE SERVICES, reprinted in THIRD ANNUAL COPYRIGHT
OFFICE SPEAKS: CONTEMPORARY COPYRIGHT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES 89,

90 (1991) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE DAB STUDY].
76. See id. at 90. FM stereo signals do not contain frequencies at the upper end of the
spectrum, that is, between 15,000 and 20,000 hertz.
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that both of these aspects could result in softened consumer demand
for their products.
II
The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA)
By enacting the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA),
Congress apparently has ended the two-decade-old debate over
whether private home taping of copyrighted sound recordings is either
fair use or infringement. Ironically, Congress ended this debate without deciding the issue. Section 1008 of AHRA precludes copyright
infringement actions based upon the manufacture or noncommercial
use of both digital and analog home 'ecording devices and media.7 7
Thus, private home taping in any medium neither infringes the copyrights in sound recordings, nor infringes the copyrights in the underlying musical compositions. Nevertheless, Congress did not answer the
question of whether home copying was fair use or infringement prior
to the legislation.
As earlier explained, AHRA is merely the codification of agreements between the recording industry and audio equipment manufacturers. The Act, which finally opened the door for the safe marketing
of digital home taping equipment 78 and media, essentially consists of
three components: (1) electronic copying controls, (2) royalties levied
on recording equipment and media and (3) a prohibition of copyright
infringement actions based on home copying. These three important
components will be described prior to making a critical analysis of the
Act.
A.

Serial Copy Management System (SCMS)

Section 1002 of AHRA prohibits importing, manufacturing or
distributing home digital recording devices unless they are equipped
with a Serial Copy Management System (SCMS). An SCMS is a computer chip that allows the user of a digital audio recorder to make only
one copy of digital source material. Thus, an SCMS allows one to
record a CD any number of times onto different Digital Compact Cassettes (DCCs) or MiniDiscs; however, no additional digital recordings
can be produced from those first generation copies. The SCMS encodes digitally recorded copies with information that will prohibit further copying by any machine equipped with an SCMS. Home digital
77. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
78. The Act does not apply to professional digital recording devices. 17 U.S.C.
§ 1001(3)(A).
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copies made from analog source materials also are encoded with in79
formation by the SCMS.
The object, as well as the effect, of an SCMS is to allow unlimited
copying from the original recording while preventing second or third
generation perfect copies of source material from being freely copied
and disseminated. Because an SCMS does not affect the distribution
or use of analog tape recorders and media, it will still be possible to
make serial copies with analog tape recorders. However, the quality
of such recordings quickly deteriorates with each generation.
Presumably in response to critics who claimed that any technical
solution to the home copying dilemma would be futile,80 the Act prohibits importing, distributing or even manufacturing any device that
could circumvent an SCMS.8 ' Section 1009 gives parties the right to
sue in federal court for violations of the SCMS provisions as well as
the royalty provisions. That section authorizes courts to award actual
and statutory damages, as well as equitable relief, including impounding the infringing equipment or media. 2
B. Royalties on Digital Hardware and Media

Besides mandating the SCMS technological measures, the Act requires royalties to be paid on digital recording devices and the digital
media used by such devices.8 3 A 2% royalty will be levied against the
"transfer price"84 of digital recorders, with a minimum royalty of $1
and a maximum of $8 per machine.8 5 Additionally, a 3% royalty will
be levied against digital recording media such as DAT, DCC and
MiniDiscs. In both cases, the royalties will be paid only once by either
the manufacturers, importers or distributors. The royalties will be de79. H.R.

REP.

No. 873(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3579 (1992).

80. See, e.g., Digital Audio Tape Recorder Act, 1990: Hearings on S. 2358 Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 219 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 DAT Hearings] (statement of
Edward P. Murphy, President National Music Publishers' Association, Inc.) (claiming that
SCMS "can be defeated at any cost, without having to enter or alter the equipment in any
way, and with no more expertise than an accomplished hobbyist").
81. 17 U.S.C. § 1002(c).
82. Id. § 1009.
83. Id. § 1004.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(12) defines "transfer price" as "the actual entered value at
United States Customs," or in the case of a domestic product, "the manufacturer's transfer
price (FOB the manufacturer... )." In this Article, current retail prices of digital media
and equipment are used for simplicity and for comparative purposes.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 1004. The maximum royalty is $12 for physically-integrated units containing more than one digital audio recording device.
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posited into the United States Treasury and the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal will administer the distribution.86
The royalties collected will be distributed to owners of copyrights
87
in sound recordings, performers, music publishers, and composers.
Specifically, § 1006(b) provides that the royalty payments must be divided into two funds: the "Sound Recordings Fund" and the "Musical
Works Fund."88 The Sound Recordings Fund is allocated 662 3% of
the total royalties collected. Two and five-eighths percent of that
share will be distributed to "nonfeatured musicians" who have performed on sound recordings distributed in the United States.89 One
and three-eighths percent of the Sound Recordings Fund will be distributed to nonfeatured vocalists. 90 Forty percent of the remaining
funds in the Sound Recordings Fund will go to "featured recording
artists" while the other 60% will go to the copyright owners in the
sound recordings (usually record companies) distributed in the United
States in both digital or analog formats. 9 ' Thus, the featured recording artists will receive 25.59 % of the total royalties, and record companies will receive 38.83 %.
The remaining 331h% of the total royalties will be allocated to the
Musical Works Fund. 92 This fund will be distributed equally among
music publishers and writers. Thus, publishers and writers each will
receive 162h% of the total royalties collected.
TABLE I:
Division of Royalties expressed as
percentages of total royalties collected:
Record Companies
38.83%

25.59%
16.66%
16.66%
1.75%
.92%
100.41%
The Act does not prescribe exactly how the individual members
of the various groups of royalty recipients will divide royalties
between themselves. Section 1007(a)(2) permits all interested parties
within a group entitled to royalties under § 1006(b), free of antitrust
liability, to proportionately divide the royalty payments between
Featured Recording Artists
Music Publishers
Writers
Nonfeatured Musicians
Nonfeatured Vocalists

86. Id. § 1005.

87. Id. § 1006(b).
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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themselves.93 Section 1007(a)(2) also provides that royalty claimants
may file joint or individual claims, or designate a common agent to
receive payment and negotiate on their behalf.94 Presumably, some
system of determining entitlement to a group's royalties will be
adopted along the lines of schemes used by BMI and ASCAP, the
composers' performance rights societies.
C. Prohibition of Copyright Infringement Actions

The third component of the Act is a provision that prohibits
copyright infringement actions based upon the manufacture or noncommercial use of both digital and analog home recording devices and
media.95 The importance of this provision can be gleaned only when
it is viewed in the light of the bitter two-decade debate over home
taping between the electronics and music industries. The prohibition
effectively ends the debate over the legality of private home copying
of musical material; home copying is now legal under federal copyright law.9 6

III
Analysis and Critique of AHRA
AHRA provides copyright holders and performers with protections that will prove to be even more necessary as digital recording
formats become popular for home use. Additionally, the Act and its
underlying industry agreements have opened the door for the introduction of new technologies, including two new prerecorded music
formats, the DCC and the MiniDisc. Thus, the Act not only benefits
the royalty recipients, but also allows society to enjoy significant benefits. The Act, however, fails to provide record producers with the protection they deserve from home copying. This is especially true in
view of the lack of a performance right in sound recordings. In the
following subparts, this Article will analyze and critique the Act.
93. Id. § 1007(a)(2).
94. Id.
95. Id. § 1008. Section 1008 provides that "[n]o action may be brought under this title
alleging infringement of copyright based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution
of a digital audio recording device, a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording
device, or an analog recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer
of such a device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings." See id.
96. Prior to the AHRA, scholarly commentators (and interest groups) argued over
whether home audio taping of music constituted copyright infringement. The Supreme
Court's 1984 decision in the Sony Betamax case did not end the conjecture. See infra note
130.
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First, it will assess the nature and operation of the major provisions
contained in the Act. Second, it will suggest elements that should
have been built into the Act but were not.
A.

Analysis of Protections Provided by AHRA

AHRA is essentially comprised of three elements: (1) SCMS, (2)
royalties and (3) a bar on infringement actions based on home taping.
These three elements of the Act will be considered individually.
1. SCMS

Adopting the SCMS was a wise choice from an economic and
policy standpoint. At least two inferior alternatives existed. First,
Congress could have rejected the idea of limiting serial copying and
instead relied solely on blank tape royalties to compensate record producers for home copying. Second, Congress could have banned unauthorized home digital copying outright.
a. Unlimited Home Copying
Congress would have considerably weakened the Act's protection
of record producers' economic livelihood had it failed to adopt some
form of serial copy restriction enforced by technical requirements. Indeed, the SCMS aspect of the Act arguably was more significant than
the royalty aspect in quelling record producers' fears of home digital
recording technology.
Prior to the emergence of consumer digital audio recording technology, record producers had some comfort in knowing that, while
quality first generation analog recordings could be made from their
products, sound quality in successive generations quickly declined as
noise and distortion increased and dynamic range decreased. 97 However, home digital recording poses a significantly greater economic
threat to the recording industry than that posed by analog home recording. This is partially because of the perfect fidelity retained in
first generation digital home copies of musical recordings.9" But the
greater threat emanates from the possibility that additional perfect
successive or serial copies might be made from homemade recordings.
This could obviate the need for consumers to purchase original authorized recordings. The record companies feared that a chain of perfect digital copies of sound recordings could be created through
97. See 1989 OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 44-47.
98. Id. at 46; Eric Fleischmann, The Impact of Digital Technology on Copyright Law,
70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 6 (1988).

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[Vol. 16:311

trading with friends, neighbors or even swap clubs.99 These perfect

copies would further reduce the demand for original recordings.
The SCMS alleviates this fear somewhat by precluding serial
copying. Yet, the, system allows unlimited copying from the original
recording. Thus, an acceptable balance is struck whereby the home
copying seen as the most acceptable form (i.e., place shifting for private use, or even making a copy for a friend'0 0 ) is freely allowed,
while unlimited serial copying (i.e., a friend making copies for her
friends and so on) is precluded. In essence, the SCMS cuts to the
heart of how digital recording technology differs from analog recording; that is, the ability to make perfect successive, not merely first generation, copies without sound quality degradation. A royalty levy
alone could not address this capability of perfect serial copying.
b. Banning Unauthorized Home Digital Copying
The SCMS technology could have been harnessed to prevent digital home copying of copyrighted works altogether. While the recording industry initially favored this solution, it was forced to recognize
that its position did not take into account one necessary element
prompting Congress to enact legislation: public opinion. Most Americans see nothing wrong with home taping, as long as it is for private,
noncommercial use, including sharing among friends. 10 1 Furthermore,
a ban on digital home taping of prerecorded material would have
killed the market demand for the new formats of digital recording
equipment, thereby depriving society of this valuable new technology.
Thus, it was correctly perceived that prohibiting serial copying would
provide record producers with adequate protection, as long as a royalty on blank tapes was instituted to compensate copyright holders for
first generation taping.
2. Royalties on Home Taping

a. International Aspects
A look at other modern, industrialized countries reveals that
adopting blank tape royalties and, in many cases, recording equipment
royalties is the current trend. As of March 1992, twenty-one countries
99. The record company's paradigmatic worst nightmare is the college dormitory,
where it is widely believed (and the author's experience verifies this belief) that students
create sizable cassette recording libraries of each others' CDs.
100. The 1989 OTA REPORT states that 75% of the individuals polled believed that it is
acceptable to make a tape for one's own use. A smaller majority also thought it acceptable
to tape a copy for a friend. 1989 OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 163.
101. Id. at 147 n.17.
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had adopted royalty systems on blank audio and video tapes: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Gabon,
Germany, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kenya, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and Zaire. 10 2 Germany, Iceland, Norway, and Spain have royalties on audio and video
hardware, and Kenya levies royalties on audio hardware.' 3
The amount of royalties levied under these countries' laws varies
widely, as does the breakdown of royalty distribution among the various claimants. Additionally, the basis for the blank tape royalties (i.e.
recording time, flat rate per tape, etc.) varies. Lawmakers in these
countries, however, are evidently unified in their conviction that considerations of fairness to artists and record producers make royalties
on home taping a necessary element of any system of copyright.
Adopting such royalties in the United States makes greater economic sense than perhaps in any other country for several reasons.
First, in the face of the multi-billion dollar annual U.S. trade deficit,
entertainment remains one of this country's most successful exports.
Indeed, U.S. songwriters, composers, musicians and record companies
produce approximately one-half of the recordings listened to (and
copied) throughout the world.1 "4 Thus, unlike other countries which
import more music than they create, a sizeable percentage of the royalties collected in the United States will stay in the United States. 0 5
Second, some countries, including Australia, Finland, Iceland, and
possibly Italy," 6 only pay royalties to foreign claimants on a reciprocal basis." 7 That is, only record companies, recording artists and authors whose home countries have royalty Schemes that benefit foreign
claimants are paid royalties. Despite the dominance of American artists and record labels throughout the world, millions of dollars in foreign blank media and recorder royalties were denied to American
music creators because of the lack of American reciprocity. Thus,
102. J.A.L.
FILM & VIDEO:

STERLING,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

RIGHTS

IN SOUND

PROTECTION OF PHONOGRAPHIC AND CINEMATOGRAPHIC

RECORDINGS,
RECORDINGS

§ 20.28 (1992) [hereinafter STERLING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS]; see 1990 DAT Hearings, supra note 80, at 64
(1990) (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
103. STERLING, supra note 102, at § 20.28.
104. S. REP. No. 294, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1992).
105. Id. However, some countries do not pay royalties to foreign claimants, even when
such claimants' home countries do pay royalties to foreign claimants. In these jurisdictions, U.S. claimants will not receive foreign royalties, even though royalties created under
the AHRA are paid to claimants irrespective of their citizenship.
106. The issue was undecided in Italy at the time of this writing.
107. DigitalAudio Recording: Hearings on H.R. 4567 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection,and Competitiveness of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1992) [hereinafter DigitalAudio Recording Hearings].
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aside from the arguments supporting the compensation of record producers for home taping, it was simply unsound trade policy to deny
our domestic recording industry the "free money" represented by foreign royalties.
One final point should be noted regarding the international aspect of the United States' enactment of a home taping royalty scheme.
Although English language information on the subject is sparse, apparently some of the countries mentioned above that have adopted
royalties on blank tapes do not pay royalties to foreign claimantsirrespective of reciprocity considerations." 8 AHRA, however,
neither contains a reciprocity requirement nor discriminates based
upon a claimant's country of origin. AHRA, therefore, gives the
United States the moral wherewithal to press foreign countries to include American record companies, performers and composers in their
royalty pools. Such pressure should be imposed as soon as possible to
maximize the benefits that the creators of American recorded music
will receive from the United States' adoption of home taping royalties.
b. AHRA's Royalty Provisions
As explained in Part II.B, the royalties established under AHRA
are based upon a percentage of the transfer price of digital recording
media and equipment. The Act institutes a 2% royalty on consumer
digital recording equipment and a 3% royalty on digital recording media such as DAT, DCC and MiniDisc. 10 9 A royalty on digital media
and recorders is needed to compensate record companies, performers
and composers for home copying of their works. It simply does not
make sense, however, to base the royalty on a percentage of a price.
The rate of royalties such as those created by AHRA is set in a
somewhat arbitrary manner. Studies that attempted to measure the
economic harm caused by analog home taping yielded conflicting results (probably due, in larger part, to the interested sponsors rather
than the raw survey results). 1 0 The recording industry and the electronics industry disagreed on whether any such harm existed at all.
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the economic effect of
home analog taping accurately predicts the effect digital home taping,
once it becomes popular, will have on the demand for prerecorded
108. S. REP. No. 294, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 44-45 (1992).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 1004.
110. The 1989 OTA REPORT concluded that the almost one. dozen studies on home
taping were insufficient as a basis for policy making. 1989 OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at
170-76. Most of the prior studies, either sponsored by the RIAA or the Home Recording
Rights Coalition (HRRC) suffered from methodological flaws, and perhaps more importantly, the sponsors denied access to the raw survey data for independent analysis. Id.
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material. The ability to make perfect digital copies at home may reduce the demand for recordings to a greater extent than did the analog taping practices. Even this intuitive assertion depends on many
unknown factors, such as the extent to which consumers care about
sound quality, the price of blank digital media relative to prerecorded
material and the value consumers place on owning an original copy of
an album instead of a homemade copy. Other factors, such as the
willingness of consumers to spend time making home recordings, also
play a role in determining the amount of a properly-figured royalty.
The inevitable arbitrary nature of choosing a royalty rate is apparent given the complicated and yet largely unquantifiable factors
that must be considered in setting a royalty rate. AHRA, however,
injects an unnecessary aspect of arbitrariness into the royalty scheme
by basing the royalties upon the prices of the digital media and recording equipment. The prices charged for products will decrease
dramatically as sales increase and the products become commonly
owned consumer items.
A prime example of this phenomena is the compact disc. When
first introduced in 1983, CDs were priced at about $30111 and firstgeneration CD players were priced at well over $1000. Today, CDs
may be purchased for less than half of their original price, and players
may be purchased for as little as $79.112 The royalties collected per
sales unit will decline as prices fall, since the royalties levied in AHRA
are based upon percentages of the prices charged for these products.
Indeed, the amount of the royalties collected may fall to a pittance as prices drop. For example, it would not be unreasonable to
expect that the price of a blank DCC will be $4 or $5 in a few yearsless than half of the current price. Calculated as a percentage of retail
prices, the 3% royalty that is to be split between the six recipient
groups under the Act would amount to a mere $.12 to $.15, while
under today's prices those same recipients receive $.30 or more. The
philosophy behind levying royalties, such as those instituted under
AHRA, is that royalty recipients are entitled to compensation for
each home recording of their copyrighted works. This philosophy is
belied when the royalty is based on a value that is certain to decrease.
Another factor accentuates this anomaly. Over the next decade,
new means of digitally broadcasting and otherwise transmitting copy111. Alan Siegal, (Si Si) Je Suis un Rock Star, BREAKING INTO THE MUSIC BUSINESS
121, n.1 (1986).
112. See, e.g., Advertisement for the electronics retailer "Fretter," BOSTON GLOBE,
April 9, 1992, at 35.
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righted musical works to audiences will be introduced. 113 These delivery technologies, which are available today, include digital audio
broadcasting (DAB), transmission over existing cable television networks and transmission over fiber optic networks that will be installed
by telephone companies, cable companies and other providers of communication services." 4 These transmission technologies, some of
which will involve pay-per-listen systems or systems capable of
noninterrupted transmission of music recordings, will facilitate CDquality digital home copying. This possibility accentuates the problem
of the declining royalty base which will occur under AHRA, since
home tapers will be able to make perfect recordings of music without
the purchase of even one original copy of the recording. Thus, while
per-unit royalties collected under AHRA decline as prices of digital
recording equipment and media fall, record producers and performers
also may suffer losses from decreased sales of original recordings due
to the substitute means of product delivery in pure digital form to
their audiences.
An additional anomaly that results if royalties are based on prices
of digital equipment and media is that manufacturers will offer diverse
product lines whose prices will vary greatly. Additionally, the American audiophile companies, such as Krell Digital, Mark Levinson and
McIntosh, will inevitably offer very high-priced versions of digital recorders while Japanese manufacturers will concentrate on less expensive models.' 15 Because AHRA's royalty scheme is price-based, a
higher royalty will be levied against expensive recorders than that levied against less expensive ones." 16 This progressive effect might be
attractive if AHRA were intended to be an extension of the tax code,
because it would put a greater burden on those who presumably could
afford it. However, the purpose behind AHRA is to compensate royalty beneficiaries for home copying of their works. In essence, a perfect copy is a perfect copy. Royalty recipients should be compensated
uniformly for uses of their works, regardless of the cost of the machine
making the copy. The fact that blank digital media will also be offered
in various grades at various prices with corresponding royalties being
113. See supra Part I.C.2.
114. Id.

115. This point is illustrated by the prices of esoteric CD players currently offered by
these firms. For example, Krell Digital's Reference 64 CD player, which digitally oversampies the CD 64 times (the standard being 4 or 8 times) carries a retail price of $12,500.
Annual Equipment Directory, AUDIO, Oct. 1992, at 128.
116. Admittedly, the variability in the actual royalties collected will be minimized by
virtue of the $8 maximum royalty on equipment set by AHRA. See 17 U.S.C. § 1004. The
actual royalties collected will vary as equipment prices fall to a level that will not implicate
this maximum limit.
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applied, further highlights the rather arbitrary nature of AHRA's royalty scheme.
At least two superior alternative methods of calculating the royalties created under AHRA were available, the first being preferable to
the second. First, the blank media royalty could have been set as a
dollar amount per minute of recording time. Many of the countries
that have adopted blank tape royalties have chosen such a scheme.117
This method, like the method adopted under AHRA, would levy a
proportionally higher royalty on the heaviest home tapers.1 18 However, unlike the adopted regime, this method would require that a
value be placed on the ability to record a certain amount of copyrighted material and that the royalty levied would accurately correspond with this valuation. Such a result, unlike the solution adopted
in AHRA, would be consistent with the philosophy underlying the
concept of royalties on blank recording media.
This recording time method for determining the royalties could
not be applied to the recording equipment. A second alternative
method of setting a blank media royalty could be, and was, applied to
the recording equipment royalty in AHRA. 1" 9 Under that scheme,
the amount of the royalty would be based on a percentage of unit
prices. A minimum dollar amount would be set-either in absolute
terms, or variable, depending upon the recording time-below which
the royalty may not fall. This would ensure that the beneficiaries
under AHRA would receive royalties commensurate with a set minimum valuation of the ability of home tapers to copy copyrighted
works.
Likewise, AHRA's digital recorder royalty has its own deficiencies. Although, unlike the blank media royalty, it is subject to a minimum royalty amount of $1 per machine, this statutory minimum is too
low. Today, even with regard to the least expensive MiniDisc digital
recorder, which costs approximately $900,120 the applicable 2% royalty would amount to about $18. The actual royalty collected, however, would be reduced to the statutory maximum of $8 per
117. The blank tape royalties in France, Germany and Austria are based on this system.
supra note 102, § 20.28.
118. This assumes that blank media capable of longer recording times would be priced
relatively higher than media capable of only short recording times.
119. A statutory minimum royalty of $1 applies to the digital recording device royalty.
17 U.S.C. § 1004. This provision is probably meaningless, as it is unlikely that the price of a
digital recorder will be available for the $50 price that would reflect a $1 royalty.
120. Tony Lafaro, CD's "Kid Brother" Has Capability to Record, THE OTrOWA CITIZEN, Apr. 24, 1993, at 12. Sony's first portable MiniDisc recorder/player carries a retail
price of $899. Id. A playback-only model is offered at $699. Id.
STERLING,
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machine. 2 ' If digital recording equipment follows the course of the
CD player, inexpensive machines costing under $200 may be available
in the future, thereby reducing the applicable royalty by 50%, to $4 or
less. A $4 royalty for a machine that may facilitate thousands of perfect clones of copyrighted musical recordings over the course of its
useful life is inequitable. Beyond this subjective assessment, AHRA's
royalty provisions are objectively arbitrary. The royalties collected
decline as
per unit of blank media or digital recorder will undoubtedly
12 2
fall.
based
are
royalties
these
which
the prices on
3.

The Division of Royalties and Passive Law Making

The inherently arbitrary nature of setting royalty rates, which
stems in part from the lack of dependable data regarding home taping
and its economic effect on copyright holders and performers, was explored above. Without such data, it is impossible to establish a royalty
rate that accurately compensates people for their artistic endeavors.
This observation is equally applicable to the other compulsory licensing provisions of the Copyright Act.12 3 However, an aspect of AHRA
which has been largely ignored is the fact that the imposition of royalties for record producers is more a matter of pure public policy than
an accurate "estimate" of the harms caused by home taping. The relevant question is largely a subjective one: How much do producers of
recorded music deserve to be compensated when someone makes a
copy of their recordings?
The concept of "harm" in relative terms was never addressed during the two-decade debate over home taping. Instead, both the recording industry and the electronics manufacturers focused on the
"harms" (or lack thereof) caused by home taping, as opposed to the
harm caused by the lack of compensation. 2 4 In the late 1970s and the
1980s, each side commissioned numerous studies to prove that home
125
taping did or did not cause economical harm to record producers.
The recording industry, however, should have emphasized an altogether different concept of "harm" to further its position in favor of
121. See 17 U.S.C. § 1004 (establishing a maximum royalty of $8 per digital recording
device and $12 for units with more than one audio recording device).
122. The argument that more royalties will be levied in the aggregate as the digital
recording formats become more popular misses the point. It fails to rebut the charge that a
royalty system based upon a fluctuating unit price is inconsistent with the philosophy that a
blank tape royalty should be designed to compensate record producers in an amount that
closely corresponds to the incidence of home taping.
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1977) (mandating compulsory licensing scheme compensating
composers for "making and distributing phonorecords" of their works).
124. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
125. See 1989 OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 139-43.
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home taping royalties. Record producers were harmed to the extent
they were not compensated for home taping of their works. It is a
matter of determining the proper baseline or starting point. If the
proper baseline is that record producers should be compensated when
others make unauthorized copies of their protected recordings, then
they are "harmed" to the extent they are riot compensated. A version
of this argument appears in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in
the Sony Betamax case,' 26 where he discussed the fourth statutory factor of "fair use." In considering the effect of "time shifting" with
home videotape recorders (VTRs) on the "potential market" for the
plaintiffs' audio-visual works, Blackmun noted:
The development of the VTR has created a new market for the
works produced by the Studios .:

.

. Because time-shifting of the

Studios' copyrighted works involves the copying of them, however,
the Studios are entitled to share in the benefits of that new market.
Those benefits currently go to Sony through Betamax sales. [The
Studios] therefore can show harm from VTR use simply by showing
that the value of their copyrights would increase if they were compensated for the copies that are used in the new market.' 27
Justice Blackmun's point applies equally to home audio taping. Manufacturers of home taping equipment and media benefit from their
customers' ability to copy protected works without compensating
copyright proprietors. To the extent record producers deserve compensation for home copying, they are harmed when they are denied
compensation.
Given the largely subjective aspect of setting royalties, reasonable
minds may differ as to whether a 2% royalty for recorders and a 3%
royalty for digital media will produce a fair return for recipients under
AHRA. Similarly, reasonable minds may differ as to whether the division of royalties between the six groups of recipients strikes a fair
balance. Predictably, the record companies take the largest amount,
almost 40%, under the statute. 28 In addition to the record companies' considerable bargaining power, the large royalty share may be
partially explained by the fact that the two proponents of digital recording hardware, Sony and Philips, also own significant interests in
major record companies. 129 Apart from evoking the humorous image
of Sony paying itself a hardware royalty, this relatively recent change
126. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 497-98 (1984); see
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1977).
127. Sony, 464 U.S. at 498 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 1006(b) (1993).
129. Robert Hilburn & Chuck Philips, Rock's New World Order, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29,
1992, at 7. In 1988, Sony, Inc. purchased CBS Records for $2 billion. Id. Shortly thereafter, Holland's Philips N.V. acquired PolyGram, A&M, Mercury and Island Records. Id.
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in the landscape of the music software industry goes far to explain the
electronics industry's willingness to accommodate the recording industry in deciding0 the legal status of home recording after years of
13
disagreement.
Predictably, the smallest percentage of the royalties goes to
nonfeatured vocalists (.92%), while nonfeatured musicians receive
only slightly more (1.75%). Arguably, this division is equitable, as
these latter groups have no formal proprietary interest in the copyrights. The proper considerations, however, are: (1) the extent to
which these groups are injured by home taping practices and (2) the
extent to which these groups deserve compensation for unauthorized
copying of their performances. If home taping significantly cuts into
the demand for prerecorded music, then everyone engaged in the recording industry is injured, since there is less revenue with which to
produce recordings and pay performers. Thus, vocalists and musicians
who earn their living playing at recording sessions, often for paltry
sums, and who usually receive no royalties based on record sales, will
suffer economic harm.'
Since the division of royalties among the
interested parties was a policy decision, equitable considerations may
have favored granting a larger percentage of the royalties collected to
nonfeatured vocalists and musicians.
Also, from a policy standpoint, it would have been desirable to
set aside a portion of the royalties collected under AHRA to support
the recording and performance of under-funded or less popular music. 132 It can be presumed that the groups of royalty recipients will
divide their portion of the royalties between themselves based upon
some estimation of popularity-record sales, for example. This in
turn should compensate record producers and artists in an amount
that reflects the frequency with which their music is copied. However,
such a method of dividing the royalties necessarily will result in the
130. Some commentators strongly believed that the court in the Sony Betamax case
would have held that home audio taping was a fair use had the issue been litigated. E.g.,
Teitelbaum, supra note 32, at 19, 31. But see Page, supra note 32, at 459; Fein, supra note
31, at 658 n.59. The electronics manufacturers correctly believed that an agreement on
royalties was preferable to years of costly litigation which could have delayed the introduction of DCC and MiniDisc to U.S. markets.
131. Jonathon King, Jazz: America's Classical Music, at 6 (on file at Harvard Law
School, to be published in ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium, 1993). Jazz musicians frequently are paid $500 or less by the smaller record companies to perform on an entire
album. Id.
132. In France, 25% of the royalties levied on home taping are devoted to the promotion of audio/visual productions and performances. 1990 DAT Hearing,supra note 80, at
66. Also, Iceland and Sweden's royalty schemes provide that 15% and 26%, respectively,
of the royalty pools be devoted to such cultural funds. Id. at 66-68.
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most popular (and wealthy) acts receiving most of the royalties, while
the creators of less popular genres will receive very little of the royalty
pie. This is arguably consistent with the "economic philosophy" that
is said to underlie the copyright clause of the Constitution. But,
surely, the authors of the copyright clause had more than commercial
success in mind when they provided that Congress "shall have power
... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. .. "133

Promoting "progress" might have been more appropriately accomplished by devoting a portion (10% or 20%, perhaps) of the royalty pool to support musical genres that do not enjoy wide commercial
success. These would include classical music (4.4% of record sales in
1992), jazz (4%), gospel (2.7%), as well as other styles that command
even less of the record market, such as folk music.'3 4 This view of
"progress" would honor the diversity of musical genres as an important value in American music and should have been promoted by
AHRA.
Given the history of AHRA's enactment, the division of royalties
and the amount of royalties provided in the Act were a result of bargaining among the interested parties rather than a conscious policy
choice by Congress. The percentage of royalties granted to the various parties under the Act is merely a reflection of relative bargaining
power. Congress' passive method of "policy making" was inappropriate, given that the results of the bargaining among the parties now
have the force of federal law. What if determinations of official policy
in other areas, such as civil rights, were left exclusively to bargaining
among interested parties? Such a privatized conception of public policymaking would ignore important American values like democracy
and equity. In some cases, governmental intervention is essential to
tip the balance in favor of those who lack bargaining power. Congress' abdication of its lawmaking function in the case of home taping
resulted in a law that may be inferior to what could have been possible
if Congress debated and enacted a "law" rather than rubber stamping
an "agreement" between interested industries. This observation is
even more evident in the third element of AHRA: the provision
prohibiting copyright infringement actions based upon the manufacuse of both digital and analog home recording
ture or noncommercial
1 35
devices and media.
8.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
134. Larry Flick, Country Gobbling GreaterShare of Music, BILLBOARD, Apr. 10, 1993,
at 1. Dominating record sales were Rock (33.2%), Urban Contemporary (16.7%), Country
(16.5%) and Pop (11.4%). Id.
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
133. U.S.
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4. Preclusion of Copyright Infringement Actions

Section 1008 of AHRA precludes any party from bringing a copyright infringement action based upon home taping. 136 Unlike the
other provisions of AHRA, § 1008 applies to both digital and analog
home taping practices.' 37
With respect to new digital recording technologies, § 1008 was
clearly warranted. A major impetus of the Act was to provide safe
legal passage for the manufacture, sale and ultimate use of home digital recording devices. 38 The electronics manufacturers accomplished
this by entering into agreements with the recording industry regarding
royalties and copy management, thereby assuaging fears of home digital recording. 39 However, § 1008 was required to ensure that future
infringement suits would never be brought.
This does not explain why § 1008 precludes infringement suits
based upon unauthorized home analog taping of copyrighted music.
This short section effectively ended the debate over whether home
analog taping of copyrighted recordings is infringement or fair use
that was initiated in 1972, when copyright protection was extended to
sound recordings. Pursuant to § 1008, home taping is neither; instead,
it was deemed legal and not an infringement. 4 °
The recording industry was sold short, since § 1008 effectively
precludes it from seeking royalties on analog home taping. The reason for this is twofold. First, home taping is now legal, and thus the
threat of copyright infringement litigation is removed. Such litigation,
based upon a theory of vicarious liability, might have been an effective way to force a royalty system for analog taping on the electronics
industry, either through settlement or victory. Second, § 1008 effectively removed the recording industry's power to lobby Congress for
an analog tape royalty. Its strongest argument for instituting such a
royalty (i.e., that home taping is not only economically damaging, but
is also copyright infringement) has been negated. The recording industry may be disabled from approaching Congress again on the analog home taping issue, since home taping is now considered a
noninfringing activity.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. The legislative history of the Act states that "[t]he purpose of [the AHRA] is to
provide a legal and administrative framework within which digital audio recording may be
made available to consumers." H.R. REP.No. 102-873(I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), reprinted in 138 CONG. REC. 9 (1992).
139. See supra Part I.C.1.
140. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.

1994]

1994]

AUDIO HOME RECORDING AcT OF 1992
AUDIO HOME RECORDING Acr OF 1992

The extension of § 1008's reach to analog taping was, like the provisions concerning royalties, not a conscious policy choice made by
Congress (except, perhaps, a conscious choice to wash its hands of the
issue after years of hearings and failed bills). Rather, it was the result
of the private bargaining that took place between the various interested parties. The recording industry was forced to give up its fight
for home analog taping compensation in return for the compromise
on digital recording royalties and SCMS.
At worst, Congress could have written § 1008 to preclude only
infringement actions based upon the manufacture or use of digital recording equipment and media. Such a result would have been consistent with the primary purpose of the Act-to address the new
problems presented by digital home recording technology and thereby
open U.S. markets to the new digital recording formats. At best, in
addition to including § 1008, Congress could have brought the home
taping debate to a fair conclusion by extending AHRA's royalty provisions to include analog, as well as digital, home taping equipment
and media. This alternative is discussed in the following section,
which addresses two elements that would have made AHRA a superior conclusion to the home taping problem.
B. AHRA: Two Missing Elements
-Congress saved itself a lot of time and energy by rubber stamping
the agreement reached between the recording and electronics industries. Unfortunately, this led to an incomplete piece of legislation that
fails to provide the creators of American recorded music with an adequate level of protection from home taping. Congress failed to include two elements in AHRA that, in fairness to those involved in the
recording business, should have been part of any legislative scheme
aimed at rectifying the inequity presented by home copying of protected musical recordings. Those two elements are: (1) royalties on
analog home taping equipment and media and (2) a performance right
in sound recordings.
1. Royalties on Home Analog Recording

AHRA, in a sense, is a very forward-looking piece of legislation.
First, analog modes of musical reproduction, broadcasting and transmission eventually will give way to superior digital methods for per-forming these functions. Digital CDs already have made impressive
inroads on their analog counterparts. Record albums can hardly be
found in retail stores and floor space devoted to CDs continues to
chip away at what, as recently as 1990, was the most popular prer-
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ecorded format: the analog cassette tape developed some thirty years
ago by Philips. 4 ' Thus, by attaching a royalty to digital home recording equipment and media, the recording industry will be compensated
for home copying as digital recording formats take hold in the marketplace. Consumers will replace their analog cassette recorders with superior digital ones as digital means of performing home recording
become increasingly affordable. As this technological transition occurs, the beneficiaries of the royalties created by AHRA will receive
greater compensation, consistent with the increase in digital home
recording.
AHRA is forward-looking in another sense. Congress insisted
that AHRA's royalty and copy management provisions apply not only
to existing digital formats, such as DAT, DCC and MiniDisc, but also
to any future means adopted for home digital audio recording.' 4 2 This
aspect of the Act protects AHRA's royalty scheme from future circumvention and it averts the need for amendments as new formats are
introduced.
These aspects of the Act should benefit future recipients of royalties as American consumers turn to digital audio recording formats.
However, the fact remains that it may take one, two or even three
decades for digital recording formats to become widely popularized.
Until digital recording devices and media enjoy deep market penetration, the threat from home copying will continue to emanate from
users of analog, not digital recorders.' 4 3 In 1988, for example, 94% of
Americans had access to cassette players, most of which were capable
of recording."' This figure represents an increase of 250% from 1978
estimates. 4 5 Yet, songwriters, performers and copyright holders will
continue to be uncompensated for the more than one billion instances

141. Flick, supra note 134. In 1992, CDs represented 56.1% of the market for prerecorded music, up from 49.6% in 1991 and 42.5% in 1990. Id. "Cassettes dropped from
43.3% of the market in 1991 to 37.3% in 1992. As recently as 1988, cassettes had 55.1% of
the market while CDs accounted for only 28.5%. LPs were down to a mere 1.2% of the
market in 1992." Id. The numbers for 1993 undoubtedly will show that the CD made
further inroads on the other formats.
142. The Act applies to any "digital audio recording device[s]" and any "digital audio
recording medium" capable of making a "digital audio copied recording" (with some exceptions). 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3),(4)(A).
143. In 1992, for example, only 12,420 DAT machines were sold in the United States, as
contrasted with the sale of 1,432,886 analog cassette decks. Home CD Player Sales Fell
14.6% in 1992, CONSUMER ELEcrRONICS, Mar. 22, 1993, at 10.
144. 1989 OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 147.
145. Id. In 1978, approximately 38% of Americans had access to cassette players.
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of home copying of their copyrighted works that occur each year in
this country alone."4
AHRA's omission of royalties for analog home taping could have
additional adverse consequences for American artists and producers
with respect to countries that have reciprocal royalty provisions. 4 7
American copyright owners and performers probably will be excluded
from foreign royalty pools, at least to the extent such royalties represent analog tapes and equipment, because the AHRA does not levy
any royalties on analog tapes and equipment. Home recording media
and equipment currently sold in the United States and abroad are almost exclusively of the analog variety. As a result, it will be some
time before American record producers attain any foreign benefits, let
alone domestic benefits, from AHRA. Given the United States' dismal trade performance in recent years, denying its successful music
industry access to foreign royalties is an indefensible result of
AHRA's omission of analog home taping royalties.
The problem of analog home taping is exacerbated when one
considers that new technologies for high quality digital transmission of
music into the home that are just over the horizon. As suggested in
Part I.C, digital audio broadcasting, digital cable transmission and fiber optic lines will make CD-quality music available to consumers
without necessitating a single purchase of a prerecorded music format.
The availability of such high quality sources of prerecorded music allows high quality recordings to be made in the home using existing
analog cassette recorders. Such home recordings may serve as
replacements for original prerecorded products. Indeed, Niro
Nakamichi, president of Nakamichi Corporation, says that "in actual
listening, the average audio maker's DAT deck doesn't really outperform our better [analog cassette] decks."' 48 Thus, producers of
prerecorded music may suffer from lost record sales as the analog
home taping problem persists or is exacerbated by the availability of
high quality digital sources.
Congress therefore should have applied AHRA's royalty provisions to analog recording equipment and blank tapes. Because it
failed to do so, AHRA's significance for copyright owners will be minimal for the foreseeable future. Only when the slow process of con146. Id. at 153-54. The OTA REPORT estimated that there were "approximately 439
million broadcast takings and 578 million takings from prerecorded music formats" in the
year prior to the survey. Id.
147. Currently, Australia, Finland and Iceland's tape royalties are conditioned on reciprocity. Italy is considering the matter. DigitalAudio Recording Hearings,supra note 107,
at 137.
148. Bryan Harrell, A Special Report: Japan, STEREO REV., July 1988, at 53, 54.
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sumer changeover to digital recording formats nears completion will
the royalties collected pursuant to AHRA come close to adequately
compensating record companies, composers and recording artists for
the widespread home copying of their works.
2. No Performance Right in Sound Recordings

United States copyright law does not mandate that performers
and copyright owners in sound recordings be compensated for public
performances of their works.' 49 Despite this fact, authors and composers have long enjoyed a performance right, subject to a compulsory
licensing scheme. Existing law, therefore, results in an anomaly when
a commercial broadcaster, for example, plays a sound recording over
the air for profit, because the performers and the sound recording
copyright holders receive nothing, while the songwriters and publishers are compensated.
The denial of a performance right to record producers and performers never has been adequately explained. The reluctance to grant
the performance right in sound recordings may be attributed in part to
the lobbying power of those who would be adversely affected: radio
and television broadcasters. These special interests, along with jukebox operators and background music services, have derived significant
profits by freely exploiting sound recordings without compensating
copyright holders and performers. 150
The recording industry has unsuccessfully attempted to persuade
Congress to rescind § 114 since Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright
Act. 5 ' The industry has failed to convince Congress despite the Register of Copyright's 1978 recommendation that "section 114 be
amended to provide performance rights, subject to compulsory licensing, in copyrighted sound recordings, and that the benefits of this right
be extended to both performers (including employees for hire) and to
record producers as joint authors of sound recordings."' 52
The omission of a sound recording public performance right, like
uncompensated home analog taping, denies a necessary source of income to performers and record companies. In contravention of the
economic philosophy behind our copyright system, the omission of the
149. The sound recording exception to the § 106 performance right is found in § 114 of
the 1976 Copyright Act.
150. D'Onofrio, supra note 12, at 169.
151. For example, H.R. No. 1805, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) was introduced, which
would have granted a performance right to the copyright holders in sound recordings subject to compulsory licensing.
152. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763, 12,766 (1978).
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sound recording performance right denies performers and record
companies the fruits of their labor.
Many musicians who perform on sound recordings are paid a
shockingly small amount for their labors. 153 Jazz musicians, for example, frequently are paid $500 or less by the smaller record companies
to perform on an entire album.'54 Additionally, although some may
harbor less sympathy for the record companies, the fact remains that a
full 84% of the records released do not even recover their production
costs. 55 Record companies depend on the revenues from a small
number of hit albums to "subsidize the losers, to finance new recordings by unknown artists, and, hopefully, to make a profit."' 56 Thus,
besides providing much-needed income to underpaid session musicians, bestowing the public performance right in sound recordings
could allow record companies, especially the smaller ones, to invest in
new acts or less commercially viable genres. Congress, if it addressed
this issue, would rectify the "free ride" radio broadcasters currently
receive at the expense of the music industry.
Radio broadcasters argue that airplay of sound recordings promotes sound recordings and helps generate sales' 57 Thus, the broadcasters claim they provide record companies and recording artists with
invaluable free advertising and are not enjoying a "free ride." This
assertion does not hold true for the vast majority of performers.
Many recordings receive a significant amount of airplay, but have negligible sales.' 58 Folk music, classical, and older recordings fall into this
category.159 One survey indicated that 55.8% of the advertising revenues generated
from six major radio markets were earned by playing
"oldies."' 6 ° Because sales of "oldies" are negligible, the "free advertising" provided by the broadcasters is worth little. Thus, the radio
broadcasters receive the "free ride," not the recording industry.' 6 '
153. King, supra note 131, at 6.
154. Id.
155. RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION

OF AMERICA, REPORT: AUDIO HOME TAPING-THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 2 (1981).

156. Id.; see Fein, supra note 31, at 652.
157. H. Craig Hayes, Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: How Far to the Horizon?, 27 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 111, 136 (1982).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. S. REP. No. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42, 58-59 (1975) (statement of Recording Industry Association of America). See Hayes, supra note 157, at 136 n.91.
161. Other evidence of this is that Top 40 radio stations usually add only five or six new
songs to their play lists each week, whereas, even as of 1975, about 900 songs were released
weekly. Copyright Law Revision, Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1320-21 (1975) (statement of RIAA). Also, many radio stations do not
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The problem represented by the omission of a performance right
in sound recordings will be exacerbated over the next few years as
sophisticated means of digitally disseminating music are introduced.
First, the demand for prerecorded music may soften, since consumers
will be able to enjoy CD-quality sound over the airwaves or via cable
and fiber optic lines. Second, record sales might be further displaced
if subscribers to these new services make their own high quality audio
recordings from them. This scenario is likely to occur, since many of
these new music delivery systems
will feature uninterrupted music, or
1 62
even pay-per-play technology.
The Copyright Office concluded that present levels of radio
broadcast home taping, and subsequent revenue losses, may increase
as a result of these emerging systems of delivering music to listeners'
homes. 163 The Copyright Office recommended that an amendment to
the 1976 Copyright Act should be adopted to create a performance
right in sound recordings in addition to levying royalties on digital
recording media and equipment." 64 Unfortunately, Congress routinely ignores the recommendations of the Copyright Office. In 1978,
for example, Congress failed to act on the Register of Copyright's recommendation that § 114 be amended to provide performance
rights in
1 65
sound recordings, subject to compulsory licensing.
Even if widespread dissemination of music by digital means does
not depress sales of sound recordings, "the authors and copyright
owners of the recordings are unfairly deprived by existing law of their
fair share of the market for performance of their works.' 1 6 6 This argument, like its counterpart in the home taping debate,1 67 is convincing because it does not depend upon an elaborate showing of "actual
economic harm" or, in this case, the lack of a benefit from broadcasting, as such harm is usually envisaged. Rather, the argument highlights what is the essence of our system of copyright: creators of
protected works must be compensated for others' use of their works in
such a way that will encourage the creators to continue to make valuable contributions to society. Finally, in the performance right context,
another argument suggested in the home taping context should be reeven announce the title or the artist of sound recordings they play, or they do so at infrequent intervals. Hayes, supra note 157, at 137.
162. See supra Part I.C.2.
163. U.S. Copyright Office Supports Digital Audio Legislation, SATELLITE NEWS, Nov.
4, 1991.
164. Id.
165. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763, at 12,766 (1978).
166. Id. (citations omitted).
167. See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
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iterated: "harm" is a relative concept. Regardless of whether or not
broadcasting helps stimulate demand for musical recordings, copyright owners and performers are "harmed" by the lack of a performance right. They are being denied the compensation they would
receive if the performance right were recognized.
Although one may disagree over which argument in favor of a
performance right is most persuasive, the fact remains that sound recording copyright proprietors and performers are being denied an important source of income. This is especially true in light of the lack of
royalties on analog home taping. The damage caused by the lack of
both a performance right in sound recordings and royalties on home
analog taping will only increase as new means of disseminating digital
representations of music are popularized. Thus, Congress should have
addressed both issues when it adopted AHRA.
IV
Conclusion
AHRA represents a first step in addressing the unfairness
presented by unauthorized home taping of musical recordings. Like
many first steps, the Act is too little, too late. Although the creators
of American music will be somewhat protected from losses caused by
digital home taping, the Act fails to rectify the fundamental unfairness
presented by analog home taping. Further, Congress missed a prime
opportunity to implement additional fairness measures in U.S. intellectual property law when it failed to bestow performance rights in
sound recordings for copyright owners and musical performers. These
two omissions from AHRA will result in the continued under-compensation of recording artists and record companies for uses of their
works. The significance of this for society should not be underestimated. The most basic premise of our system of copyright is that creators should be protected from unauthorized uses of their works in a
manner that will encourage them to continue to make important societal contributions. Lord Mansfield stated it aptly:
We must take care to guard against two extremes, equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time in
the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their labor and ingenuity; the other that the
world may not be168deprived of improvements, nor the progress of
the arts retarded.
Digital recording technology is merely one development that will
expose shortcomings in the legal protection of intellectual property
168.

LYNMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 244 (1968).
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rights in this country. It is widely believed that "electronic highways"
will replace the record retailers and videocassette rental businesses.
In the future, people will use interactive communications systems to
order entertainment products that will be instantaneously downloaded
through networks onto computerized home entertainment systems.
Private bargaining between entertainment interests and the providers
of such delivery services will help structure protections for intellectual
property owners. However, Congress must not, as it did in the case of
home audio taping, abdicate its responsibility of ensuring that the bargains that are reached result in fair compensation for the creators. In
the spirit of Lord Mansfield's comments, Congress must respond in a
timely manner to protect American creators of entertainment from
future technological advancements and the threats such advancements
may pose.

